Comment

Representation ID: 10083

Received: 28/07/2022

Respondent: Manor Oak Homes

Agent: Armstrong Rigg Planning

The main reason why the council is seeking to argue a stepped trajectory as part of its plan is because the emerging strategy remains significantly dependent on strategic sites burdened by extensive and expensive infrastructure requirements. This is confirmed as such in its stepped trajectory topic paper.

A large element of the council’s proposed supply (2,175 dwellings) is once again to come from four large, complicated sites in and around the town centre, none of which are anticipated to deliver a single unit within the first decade of the plan period. Indeed, based on our review of these opportunities below it is suggested that the council is ready concede that they are entirely undeliverable, hence their inclusion deep into the plan period.

Additionally, the bulk of supply from years 2030 to 2040 is expected at two new settlements – at Kempston Hardwick (covered by Policy HOU14) and at Little Barford (covered by Policy HOU19). The anticipated delivery rates at each, peaking at 600 dwellings per annum (dpa) during the final three years of the plan period, is simply astonishing and certainly not grounded in reality.

The Development Strategy
The council’s development strategy, set out as draft Policy DS2(S) ‘Spatial Strategy’ of the Local Plan 2040 is an ambitious one. It seeks to focus almost entirely upon securing housing through a combination of urban regeneration, urban extensions coupled with strategic infrastructure delivery, new settlements, and allocations in neighbourhood plan. In short, there are no quick wins. The ambitions are of course laudable, and all elements of the strategy accord with the various related threads of the NPPF. However, the strategy is littered with likely insurmountable challenges and instances where the council has simply failed to face the reality of the sites it is seeking to allocate.

The first critical area that the strategy has failed to grapple with in a sound manner is the mounting and soon to be acute need for new homes now, in the earliest years of the plan period. In this respect the strategy is imbalanced. To present our analysis in respect of the trajectory in a different way – if the council was to prepare a paper demonstrating its 5-year housing land supply position for the initial years of the plan without a reduction in the annual requirement prior to 2025 it would only be able to demonstrate an approximate 3.64-year supply.

The council has identified in its trajectory that the current commitments across the Borough – largely comprising the completion of larger sites first identified in the previous Local Plan adopted some 20 years ago in 2002 – will provide almost all new homes across the Borough during the first five years of the plan period. Incredibly, and bearing in mind the anticipated 1,925-unit undersupply based on the council’s LHN, only three of the council’s new allocations to be introduced by the Local Plan 2040 are expected to deliver any units prior to 2026 (so the first 5 years) and even then they will only yield 63 units. To expand on this point and set against a deficit of 3,450 units for the first 10 years of the plan period these new allocations will only yield a total of 983 units prior to 2030, so less than a single year’s worth of need.

To clarify, when faced with a deficit in supply in the first 5-years and indeed 10-years of the plan period the council has chosen to ignore this inconvenience rather than allocate the sites required to meet these needs now. The success of the plan’s development strategy and its approach to growth continues to rely on 20-year-old sites to continue to meet the changed and more substantial needs of today. This appears to represent the complete antithesis of the NPPF’s drive to significantly boost the supply of new homes and is entirely at odds with the requirements of paragraph 68 of the NPPF to identify a supply of specific, deliverable sites for years one to five of the plan period.

On this basis the plan’s development strategy, in respect of securing sufficient housing delivery over the next 5-years is not currently fit for purpose. It is in fact too ambitious and fails to meet the basic requirements of a local plan – that is to meet the immediate development needs of the Borough. A far greater variety of sites are required which can be delivered much earlier in the plan period and are devoid of any physical, technical, or legal constraints.

Indeed, the proposed plan features the exact same glaring omission as the adopted Local Plan 2030, that is an inexplicable paucity of new allocations on the edge of the Bedford/Kempston urban area. This is highlighted by Policy DS5(S) ‘Distribution of growth’ which identifies that only 1,500 of the additional dwellings to be delivered by the plan will be on strategic locations adjacent to the urban area with the delivery of all of these hindered by the need for significant infrastructure delivery. More straightforward urban edge sites offer the best balance of deliverability (generally unconstrained greenfield sites served by existing urban infrastructure) and accessibility with land at the correct locations afforded swift access to existing shops, services, and facilities within the urban area. Our client’s land at Salph End represents a compelling opportunity to deliver exactly this type of site, one which we reiterate later in this submission.

Town Centre Sites
Turning to look at the council’s anticipated supply over the 2030 to 2040 period the continued inclusion of the four saved ‘town centre’ sites as allocations in the plan along with an additional opportunity at Ampthill Road represents a significant concern to our client. Put simply we do not consider that these sites are deliverable and certainly we do not feel that the council has made sufficient evidence available to justify their inclusion in the plan. This corresponds with our client’s position put towards the examination of the Local Plan 2030. Combined we consider that the town centre sites are significantly burdened by infrastructure, legal and environmental constraints that means they cannot possibly be included in the council’s trajectory with any certainty.

Whilst we would usually comment on the substance and direction of the allocation policies covering each site it is noted that the council is instead relying on an approach which ‘saves’ the four previous allocations included in the Local Plan 2030. Only Ampthill Road benefits from a new allocation policy. In which case our commentary in respect of this submission critiques the achievability of each site and the way in which significant doubts around their delivery impact on the efficacy of the updated development strategy.

Infrastructure Constraints

One of the key constraints to the delivery of the four original town centre sites (those allocated by the Local Plan 2030) is the lack of funding for key pieces of infrastructure, the Ford End Underbridge / Prebend Street Relief Road prominent amongst them. On review, and considering our concerns in respect of this matter raised at the time, the inspectors of the Local Plan 2030 recognised the dubious nature of the town centre sites with reference to supporting infrastructure in particular, albeit giving the council the benefit of the doubt due to the required early review of the plan.

In their report, and on the town centre sites, the Inspectors confirmed:

“75. We are aware that some of the sites identified have remained undeveloped for some time and some are subject to multiple constraints, not all of which can be resolved in the short-term, although the continued involvement of One Public Estate (OPE) in bringing together public land, and promoting it for redevelopment, will help play a part. The provision of infrastructure with the help of the Housing Infrastructure Fund (HIF) will assist in bringing the town centre sites forward in a co-ordinated manner and ensure the viability of future development. A funding bid for the construction of the Ford End Underbridge has been identified as a key component in ensuring the delivery of future development across the town centre.

76. At the time of writing this bid has not been formally approved, and so there is no certainty that funding for the project will be secured entirely through the public purse. However, we are conscious that without inclusion within the plan, the impetus to secure funding is less likely, reducing the likelihood that the redevelopment of town centre sites would come forward in a coordinated manner. In such circumstances the objectives of the plan would be unlikely to be realised. We therefore consider that uncertainty over the HIF bid at this time should not preclude the town centre sites from allocation. Nevertheless, we have taken a cautious approach in relation to the timescale for delivery of these sites in our assessment of likely housing supply.”

In which case one key reason why the previous Inspectors maintained the sites as allocations in the plan was to reinforce the council’s bid for HIF funding for a critical piece of infrastructure required to enable the town centre sites, the Ford End Underbridge. The reliance of the delivery of these sites on this project is in fact emphasised beyond doubt in the adopted Local Plan 2030 and in respect of the Ford End Road site, with the text supporting its allocation stating:

“7.13 Critical to the overall brief which will emerge for the scheme is the fact that the housing concept must both deliver attractive modern urban living and either improvements to the transport networks or a form of development which will limit the impact on the network. This will to some degree depend on the outcome of the Council’s Housing Infrastructure Fund bid which seeks to secure funding for a replacement Ford End Road bridge and the provision of the Prebend Street relief road. In addition, a western access to Bedford Midland station for the public and operational purposes should be constructed if site constraints permit.”

Shortly after the adoption of the Local Plan 2030 the council’s HIF bid for £15m was rejected by Secretary of State Robert Jenrick MP as it did not meet the criteria required to secure HIF money. To this end this critical piece of infrastructure required to deliver the town centre sites remains unfunded. The reliance on the road scheme does, however, remain. Paragraph 5.11 of AECOM’s infrastructure report supporting the council’s stepped trajectory confirms that “the Prebend Street Relief Road…supports the cumulative growth in the urban area, particularly the existing allocations on Ford End Road and South of the River, as well as from (sic) smaller new sites”. However, at paragraphs 4.3.48 to 4.3.50 of AECOM’s main Infrastructure Delivery Plan they reiterate that following the unsuccessful HIF bid these critical highways upgrades in the town centre remain unfunded with the now £16m cost to be covered by “a range of sources including developer funding”.

On this basis the justification for including (retaining) these sites in the plan cited by the Local Plan 2030 Inspectors falls away. There was hope that their allocation would attract the necessary government funding required to aid their delivery – this strategy failed. In which case what the council is now left with is four sites crucial to the delivery of its development strategy which are devoid of the means to deliver the infrastr

Ownership and Legal Constraints

There are other critical issues with at least two of the town centre sites that will at best significantly delay their delivery but more likely render them entirely unachievable. Focusing on Land South of the River the key issue remains the complexity of its ownership. Whilst the One Public Estate (OPE) initiative will assist in coordinating the delivery of the assets of bodies such as Bedford Borough Council, the NHS and Network Rail it was made clear during the site assessment process accompanying the Local Plan 2030 that the site is burdened by a far more complex tapestry of ownership comprising private landlords, investment companies and commercial businesses. It is unclear to what extent each of the individual landowners was engaged as part of the Local Plan 2030 process or indeed whether they have once again been engaged in respect of the Local Plan 2040 process. Accordingly, it remains unclear whether any form of binding Joint Landowner Agreement is in place allowing for the robust promotion of some of the key tranches of land within the masterplan area.

It is acknowledged that the bodies comprising the OPE played an active role in the formulation of the original Town Centre Masterplan, essentially a high-level delivery strategy which formed part of the evidence base of the Local Plan 2030. However, it was entirely unclear what involvement the remainder of the private and corporate landowners across the allocation had in the process. Paragraph 1.16 of the document stated that “there are a number of sites that are linked and have interdependencies requiring a co-ordinated approach to their release, especially those within the ownership of One Public Estate partners. It is recognised that these sites can be difficult to unlock, and as a consequence may take time to come forward, possibly beyond the timeframe of the emerging Local Plan”. This suggested that the full list of landowners was only coordinated to the loosest extent prior to the formulation of this strategy.

The ownership history of the land at Ford End Road is similarly complex. Prior to its identification in the Local Plan 2030 the land was promoted as part of the Call for Sites exercise in December 2015 by the council’s own Environment and Sustainable Communities Director. It is notable that the Call for Sites form submitted at the time failed to conclude on whether there were legal or ownership constraints or whether the site was even available for development. It did, however, confirm that the initial 24ha site had six owners comprising a mixture of public bodies, private investors and existing businesses. The owners were stated as Bedford Borough Council, Charles Wells, National Grid, Rolls Royce, Network Rail and the NHS. This assumed the inclusion of the brewery land that the site now wraps around. At this point the Ford End Road development was intended to secure the complete regeneration of a range of bad neighbour uses at the heart of one of the town centre’s largest residential areas. This objective allowed the then draft allocation to gain significant traction.

On allocating the site paragraph 7.11 of the now adopted Local Plan 2030 confirms that “the Land at Ford End Road is a substantial development site to the west of the town centre which is currently in a number of ownerships. As such it is essential that development is guided by a comprehensive development brief which ensures that should some parcels come forward independently they will not prejudice the overall aims of the brief. At the present time the Eagle Brewery occupies part of the site and the Plan does not rely on any housing contribution from the site in the period before 2030. The brief must therefore demonstrate how the early phases of development can coexist alongside the Brewery whilst setting out how a comprehensive vision can be achieved across the site in the longer term”.

However, coinciding with the adoption of the plan Marston’s Brewery was in the process of acquiring the site as a going concern at a cost of £55m. This transaction is now complete. The former owner, Charles Wells, has now relocated its operations to the edge of the urban area. Marston’s has since begun to expand its own brewing operations at the site kick-started by an initial investment of £250,000 into its general refurbishment and followed by an increase in the number of beer lines brewed on the premises along with the operational decision to make the brewery its centre of distribution for import lines such as Estrella Damm. In short, the site now represents a key part of Marston’s portfolio and it looks extremely unlikely that this land remains available to the council. It is, however, clearly still assumed that the brewery land will come forward at some point for development.

Technical and Environmental Constraints

In respect of land at Ford End Road contamination, and the costs associated with the remediation of the site, clearly remains the most critical concern in respect of its delivery. We understand that since 2002 there have been consistent attempts to sell the old gas works land on its own since it was decommissioned. These attempts have continually been hampered by issues relating to a lack of information in terms of the extent of contamination and any necessary remediation. We understand that the current owners are not prepared to give any warranties in respect of these matters.

The deliverability of the site is key to ensure that it can be considered as a sound allocation in the context of the Plan’s spatial strategy. The lack of market interest for a potential housing site that has carried consistent Officer support since at least 2002 is compelling. BNP Paribas first placed the land on the market on behalf of National Grid in May 2016. This position endures at the time of writing with expressions of interest invited on the 5ha gasworks site by noon on 7th September 2022 . Based on ongoing updates provided to our client by a local agent we understand that, despite sporadic interest in the site, it remains on the market largely due to the burden of remediation.

It was also made clear from the Bedford Masterplan sites assessment document, prepared in support of the Local Plan 2030, that there are a number of environmental constraints that would influence the delivery of development within the Land South of the River allocation. The most significant of these appear to relate to heritage and archaeology. It is not clear whether any further work has been undertaken in respect of these matters since. We would expect that if they had they would comprise part of the evidence base of the Local Plan 2040. Specifically, the development of the Kingsway Triangle, at the core of the site, is impacted by 26 Cauldwell Street, a Grade II listed building which will require appropriate treatment of its setting from any surrounding development.

In addition, much of the allocation potentially impacts on the historic King’s Ditch of the Medieval town, which is an area of high archaeological value. The Historic Environment Records (HER) for Bedford shows archaeological finds in relation to the Anglo-Saxon settlement including timber framed buildings, tips, a hearth, pot kiln and bread oven. In the absence of any heritage appraisal of the land or below ground survey work it is impossible to conclude how heritage assets will impact on both delivery and site capacity.

A large portion of the site comprises the Britannia Road car park which provides staff parking for Bedford Hospital, one of the largest employers in the town. Loss of even a small proportion of the capacity provided by this already oversubscribed facility would place crippling pressure on parking in and around the hospital site. Without any indication that subscription to this car park is due to decrease the feasibility of this element of the allocation falls on the lack of an alternative strategy for replacement car parking provision.

We requested that the council produces clear evidence to respond to all of these issues, across both sites, as part of the Local Plan 2030 process, albeit it was not forthcoming. There appears to be even less information made available in respect of the delivery of these key sites as part of this consultation with the council apparently seeking to ‘bank’ them as saved allocations. However, the comments made by the previous Inspectors who raised reservations about the deliverability of the town centre sites indicate that they must be investigated afresh, and indeed more rigorously, as part of this process to warrant their retention in the council’s housing trajectory. Both the Land South of the River and Ford End Road allocation demand the production of a significant amount of additional evidence to justify their renewed inclusion as a combined source of 1,700 new homes over the plan period.

Viability

The viability of the town centre sites is currently a concern that must be taken very seriously by the council. The viability assessment of each, prepared by Carter Jonas and included as part of the evidence base of the Local Plan 2040, demonstrates that none of the four town centre sites would be viable based on a combination of 30% affordable housing (the policy requirement) and set against current day benchmark land values and project costs. Each of the Land South of the River, Ford End Road, Greyfriars and Ampthill Road sites would only be demonstrably viable based on optimistic projections in respect of appreciating residential market values, a reduction in affordable housing delivery (in some instances to 0%) and an assumed start on site date of no sooner than 2030. In short, there is a significant level of conjecture around whether these sites will ever be viable.

The land at Ford End Road is a strong case in point. The council has failed to learn from the difficulties experienced in the past in relation to realising the redevelopment of the site in light of the significant costs and technical constraints related to its contamination. Proposals were first in place as long ago as 2002 to realise the land as a new sustainable community at the town. To stimulate its delivery a Development Brief for the Gas Works Site was adopted as SPD in July 2002, an initiative that was bolstered by significant financial support from the East of England Development Agency of around £2 million. An outline planning application was then submitted that secured a recommendation for consent for 154 dwellings and 9,000ft² of employment space (03/01660/OUT). Tellingly this permission lapsed due to a failure to agree a satisfactory planning obligation. This is a strong indication that viability represented a critical constraint even at a time when the housing market was reaching its peak. Therefore, despite the provision of an enabling development brief, the securing of funding for remediation and demonstrable developer interest the site continues to lie entirely undeveloped.

On this basis the Carter Jonas Viability Assessment serves to amplify rather than allay these concerns in respect of its deliverability. The financial appraisal results at Table 3 of the document demonstrate that the residual value of the developable area of the site (apparently including the currently unavailable brewery due to the use of a development target of 700 dwellings) may be somewhere between -£4.4m and -£12.3m. This is depending on affordable housing contributions with the least level of loss representing a zero contribution. It is only when speculative land and market housing costs for the 2030/31 period are factored in that Carter Jonas appear confident enough to demonstrate a positive land value of £9.1m including a 30% affordable housing contribution (£23m without). This is purely speculation.

Critically, in calculating the development costs at paragraphs 2.7 to 2.29 of the report Carter Jonas appear to omit reference to one key abnormal – the cost of remediation. The Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) published guidance entitled ‘Guidance to Dereliction, Demolition and Remediation Costs’ in March 2015 that explored model remediation costs across a range of site types. Figure 2 of the guidance shows that the remediation of sites of this type, comprising smaller gas works and various open industrial land, would likely command an upper cost of approximately £740,000 per hectare prior to the safe implementation of a residential use. This equates to remediation costs across the site of approximately £12.58m (2015 prices). Based on the same approach taken by Carter Jonas in index-linking costs and values up to the 2030/31 period it is anticipated that this figure would amount to close on £20m at the point of development. This would at best result in one of the Council’s key residential sites likely delivering zero affordable housing and would most likely render it unviable unless all of Carter Jonas’ projections are realised.

Otherwise, the findings in respect of the other town centre sites are far from positive. In respect of the Greyfriars site (287 dwellings) paragraphs 3.41 and 3.42 conclude:

“The viability modelling of the Greyfriars site indicates that residential development is not viable when the residual land value is compared to the site’s Benchmark Land Value based on current day costs and values. However, the sensitivity analysis indicates that viability improves in the scenario where growth and inflation is applied, to the point that the scheme’s development value shows a positive residual land value, although this remains significantly below the Benchmark Land Value.

The Greyfriars site includes the urban renewal of social housing, and in reality BPHA (the housing provider) may not sell its land to implement the new housing scheme, which would lower the Benchmark Land Value for the Greyfriars site overall. It is not uncommon for urban estate renewal schemes to show a deficit position against the Benchmark Land Value in terms of the financial viability assessment and subsequently proceed on this basis. This is because, there is usually an investment programme that seeks to renew an asset that it coming to the end of its life and is considered to be a long term liability.”

In which case the viability of this proposal appears to be based on yet more assumptions, that is the availability of public project funding. In any event, and even without an affordable housing contribution, the margins are small with an at-best £4.4m residual land value estimated at 2030/31.

The viability of both Land South of the River and Ampthill Road once again appear troubling based on current day benchmarking and costs. Together these sites are heavily reliant on accurate appreciation in market values to achieve a positive residual land value by 2030/31, albeit it is acknowledged that the Ampthill Road land would currently carry a positive residual land value in the instance of a 0% affordable housing contribution. In respect of Land South of the River the key hub site of the Kingsway Triangle represents the parcel most at risk in respect of viability with negative values in the event that a 30% affordable housing contribution is required. In any event all matters in respect of the viability of the site must be considered alongside the significant infrastructure, environmental and legal constraints identified elsewhere in our submission.

New Settlements
The second limb of the council's trajectory that causes us significant concern relates to the extraordinarily swift projected delivery of two significant and complicated new settlements, at Kempston Hardwick and Little Barford, which between them are to deliver over 50% of the council’s residual housing requirement over the plan period – specifically 7,600 houses. These are all to be delivered in the period 2030 to 2040 following the completion of various pieces of strategic infrastructure. We do, however, consider that many of the council’s assumptions which lead them to the delivery trajectory of both sites are hugely misjudged and not based on any apparent evidence.

Delivery rates

The council’s trajectory, set out in the relevant topic paper, seeks to demonstrate that across the two new settlements the council will secure 7,600 dwellings over a 10-year period. On average this represents the delivery of 760 houses across per annum. This figure is significantly bolstered by the council’s expectations that by 2037/38 these new settlements between them will be yielding 1,200 houses each year, 600 houses at each site. This represents approximately four completions every single day over a three-year period – that is almost 30 likely similar new homes coming onto the market each week.

These expectations represent a gross misunderstanding of how the housing market operates. As referenced elsewhere in this submission our client recently completed a public inquiry in respect of their Section 78 appeal seeking permission for the delivery of their land at Salph End. During this inquiry both parties – our client and the council – engaged in a rigorous assessment of housing delivery across the Borough which included a suite of evidence submitted by development in respect of intended delivery rates on individual sites.

Based upon responses from a range of national housebuilders the average delivery rate per developer is approximately 50-75 dwelling per annum per site. The only instances where delivery expectations exceeded 75dpa were at Wixams (200dpa) and at Wootton (121dpa). There were, however, extenuating circumstances allowing a higher rate of delivery in each instance. At Wixams the housing was being delivered by Barratt David Wilson Homes who were delivering 100dpa under each brand – essentially there were two developers on site. Then, at Wootton the 121dpa target was to be achieved through a consortium of three developers working closely together – Taylor Wimpey, Bellway and Bovis. Based on the more productive Wixams site it would require 12 developers working simultaneously spread across both new settlements, each delivering 100dpa, to achieve the 1,200dpa anticipated from 2037 onwards. The market could not withstand this, consequently the development industry would not support this, and in any event the likely supply of labour will not be able to accommodate this.

In comparison the council’s previous proposed new settlement at Colworth, which was included in the initial submission draft of the now adopted Local Plan 2030, was anticipated to deliver 275dpa following the construction of its own proposed railway station. Our client challenged even these expectations at the time as being unrealistic. To now assume the not one but two new settlements will deliver up to 600dpa each concurrently is fantastical and not rooted in any form of reality.

The council does of course have experience in delivering new settlements. Wixams Village to the south of Bedford is now delivering homes at a consistent rate and represents a vital contributor to the Borough’s housing land supply. It also presents an ideal case study demonstrating the reality of the delivery of new settlements both by the council but also within the specific housing market area.

In November 2016, Lichfields published a comprehensive assessment of industry average delivery rates for strategic development sites entitled titled ‘Start to Finish: How Quickly do Large-Scale Housing Sites Deliver?’ (November 2016, followed by an equally helpful update in February 2020). This report recognises that there are a lot of factors that influence the delivery rate on large sites including the strength of the local housing market, the number of sales outlets and the tenure mix of units. On average, however, it finds that the build-out rate for sites of more than 2,000 homes is just 161 homes.

Helpfully the report includes the figures on the delivery rate of the Wixams development as one its sample developments used to identify its average lead in times and delivery rates. Excluding its first year of delivery (only 8 dwellings) the report shows that Wixams delivered on average just 137 dwellings per year for the following 6 years (up to 2015/16, the date of publication of the Lichfield report). In respect of completion in the years since we refer to the council’s own monitoring data (its annual housing monitoring reports) which show that in the years since annual completions were 37, 47, 95, 114 and 177 or an average of only 94dpa. Compared to this analysis even the council’s expectations of 200dpa for each new settlement in the second and third years of delivery seem incredibly ambitious.

Returning to the 600dpa figure it is then notable that of the 70 sites assessed by Lichfields, ranging from 500 to 15,000 dwellings, only two of them saw the delivery of more than 600 homes in a single monitoring year – Cambourne near Cambridge and The Hamptons on the edge of Peterborough. In which case local experience born out of the Wixams delivery, the average delivery rates of 161dpa for large sites calculated by Lichfields, and even the long list of individual delivery years shown in the raw data provided by Lichfields shows that the council’s expectations of 600dpa on not one but two sites in the Borough does not stand up to any sort of scrutiny.

In terms of lead in times and first completions the council’s projections are once again very optimistic. The timescales indicated by the council’s ‘Stepped Trajectory Topic Paper’ suggest that first completions will be recorded on each site during year 2030/31. Then, it is expected that they would hit the ground running with an impressive delivery of 100 units in the very first year. For two new settlements which will require an entirely new network of infrastructure linking them to primary transport networks this is unrealistic. Turning once again to the ‘Start to Finish’ analysis it identifies an average planning approval period of 6.1 years for site of 2,000 homes or more. This timescale accounts for the period from first identification to the submission of the application and then the time taken to secure an implementable consent.

On the basis of the adoption of the Local Plan 2040 in December 2023 as per the Local Development Scheme and allowing for the average planning to first completion period of 6.1 years there is a chance that homes may be ready on each site by 2030 as estimated. However, due to the complexity of each proposal, the requirement that they both ‘plug in’ to other overarching infrastructure strategies (including East West Rail – see below) and reflecting on the gestation period for a scheme of the same scale in the same borough, the Wixams, of 10.5 years (taken from the Start to Finish analysis) we are confident that at best first completions should be expected closer to 2035.

It is then noted that both new settlements are included in the plan to complement the delivery of proposed rail infrastructure, situated as they are in the proposed East West Rail (EWR) corridor either side of Bedford. On this basis it is clear that the delivery of the new route and the two new stations which will serve the settlements will play a key role in unlocking their development potential. Indeed, in respect of the new settlement at Kempston Hardwick paragraph 4.85 of the plan confirms that “the likely timing of key infrastructure provision, particularly EWR and the A421 (road upgrade) mean that the development will take place later in the plan period and deliver around 3,800 homes by 2040”. On that basis it is helpful to look at some additional case studies of the time taken to deliver new railway stations, all of which were proposed to complement new growth:

• East Midlands Parkway (Midland Main Line) – Delivery timescale = 9 years (planning submission to operation), but unclear what the lead in time was for an application:
Outline planning application (Ref: 00/00656/OUT) submitted to Rushcliffe Borough Council in June 2000 and permitted in November 2002. 2 subsequent applications to vary consent to allow reserved matters application to be submitted later (Ref: 05/01514/VAR and 06/00965/VAR). Reserved matters application submitted in February 2007 and approved in October 2007 (Ref: 07/00417/REM). The station opened in January 2009.

• Stratford-Upon-Avon Parkway – Delivery timescale = 10 years (proposals to operation) or 3 years (planning submission to operation):
In 2003, an initial study considered the possibility of a Parkway Station. In 2008 a further study was undertaken that indicated that there would be sufficient demand for a railway station located at this site. The proposed station was then included within the second Warwickshire Local Transport Plan 2006-2011. An outline planning application was submitted by Warwickshire County Council in October 2010 and approved in April 2011 (Ref: SDC/10CC058). The Station opened in May 2013.

• Cambridge North – Delivery timescale = 14 years (proposal to operation) or 4 years (planning submission to operation):
A station serving the north of Cambridge was first proposed in 2003 in the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Structure Plan. A major scheme business case was presented to the Department of Transport in 2007. Progress was slow due to a number of issues including difficulties in relocating rail freight operations elsewhere, as well as funding difficulties. A full planning application was submitted to South Cambridgeshire District Council in July 2013 and approved in July 2015 (Ref: S/1497/13/CM). The station opened in May 2017.

These case studies suggest the average period between the proposal of a new station and its opening is approximately 12 years. Even then these are all for new stations on existing railway routes. In the case of EWR the railway line will itself first need to be constructed, a project which currently only proposes stopping services at an upgraded Ridgmont Station, approximately 8km to the south. Planning permission will then be required, funding secured, and all engineering and construction works completed prior to the station opening.

Closer to home the delivery of the Wixams Station is further evidence of both the delays and uncertainty related to the delivery of new railway infrastructure. With funding part secured from Gallagher Estates as part of a 2006 Section 106 Legal Agreement, of which Bedford Borough Council were a signatory, it was anticipated that match funding would be secured from Network Rail to allow delivery of the station by 2014. Following prioritisation of the EWR project Network Rail effectively withdrew their own funding pledge leaving the delivery of the station in doubt. The council has only very recently been able to identify alternative funding for its delivery and a period of further consultation closed on 24th July 2022. This included a project timeline suggesting that the station is intended to open in 2024. Even if this target is hit it would represent a delivery period of 22 years following the initial identification of the Wixams project in the 2002 Local Plan.

In which case there are several questions that the council must answer conclusively in its evidence base to provide assurances that these two new settlements can be included as such a key component of supply in its trajectory. These are:

• Based on limited evidence in respect of deliverability, feasibility, and phasing for each new settlement in the evidence base of the Local Plan 2040 (indeed, the Kempston Hardwick proposal is not even mentioned in the council’s ‘New Settlements Assessment’ topic paper – a perplexing omission) how can the council support its assumptions of first delivery within 7 years of the adoption of the plan?
• Taking into account the rigorous analysis of Lichfields in respect of completion rates (concluding at an average across all large sites of 162dpa), allied with the similar rates of delivery at Wixams and the evidence presented by numerous developers towards the inquiry relating to our client’s own land, how can the council possibly justify an upper delivery rate of 600dpa concurrently at each new settlement?
• Considering the intention of both settlements to complement and be supported by the delivery of significant new road and rail schemes can the council clearly demonstrate how build-out rates are positively catalysed by the delivery of this infrastructure and can it be assured that the completion of new homes will not be compromised by any delays in delivery (funding, hidden archaeology, ground conditions etc)?

Without a satisfactory and rigorous response to all of these questions it is impossible for the council to demonstrate that its current trajectory in respect of the two new settlements is justified. By pushing the first delivery of each site backwards to the more realistic 2035/36 monitoring year and by then reducing annual delivery rates at each site to the benchmark 161dpa indicated by the Lichfields study this would see the loss of almost 6,000 homes form the council’s trajectory. This represents a critical issue in respect of the deliverability of the plan and its strategy.

Conclusions on the Development Strategy
What is clear from the analysis set out above is that the council’s continued heavy reliance on five town centre sites (the four previously allocated in the Local Plan 2030 and the proposed additional site at Ampthill Road) and two substantial and complicated new settlement proposals represents a significant flaw in its development strategy. It also places the plan’s ability to deliver the level of housing required prior to 2040 at significant risk, particularly considering the minimal 4.6% uplift applied to its LHN.

In total the five town centre sites are expected to yield 2,705 dwellings over the plan period before 2040. If even 50% of these dwellings do not come forward in time the council will miss its overall development target of 27,100 homes. Bearing in mind that the adopted Local Plan 2030 anticipated 1,441 of these dwellings to be complete prior to 2030 the slippage in delivery timescales over a 3-year period already suggests reliance on these sites presents unacceptable risk to its development strategy.

Then, based on the application of more realistic assumptions in respect of both delivery timescales and then annual built rates at the council’s two new settlements we contend that up to a further 6,000 homes should be removed from the trajectory. This would surely provide a significant nail in the coffin of the soundness of the plan. Previously the council sought to shorten the plan period to dodge this bullet. This option no longer exists with paragraph 22 of the NPPF requiring a plan period which extends at least 15 years beyond the year of adoption. This would take the council through to 2038.

The combination of the council’s lowered delivery targets for the 2020-2030 period (see our analysis of the stepped trajectory in Enclosure 2) along with this likely slippage and significant reduction in delivery during the 2031-2040 period results in a development strategy which is full of holes and drastically inadequate. The council cannot afford to proceed on this basis. There is an evident need to approach the Local Plan 2040 as one which significantly boosts the supply of housing now whilst also being realistic in respect of its supply later. A wholesale review of the current draft strategy is necessary, one which must include the identification of alternative sites set against an alternative strategy which seeks to make the most of deliverable and sustainable development opportunities adjacent to the urban area.

Conclusions on soundness

Policy DS2(S): The spatial strategy of the plan as drafted is unsound. It includes a rigid, imbalanced, and overly ambitious strategy which is too heavily reliant on constrained urban sites, many of which cannot be demonstrated as either deliverable or developable, along with substantial new settlements and communities which as demonstrated by the proposed housing trajectory will not begin to deliver homes until beyond 2030 at the very earliest and then nowhere close to the rates suggested by the council. It is a strategy which fails to meet its most basic requirement of achieving a 5-year supply of housing land and fails to secure any level of sufficient delivery until at least 10 years into the plan period.

Crucially it fails to make the most of sustainable and swiftly deliverable development opportunities on the urban edge such as that of our client’s land. Combined, these weaknesses result in a plan which will fail to keep up with housing needs for the entirety of the plan period and will most likely fail to meet its overall housing target. These factors will exacerbate affordability and result in other unsustainable impacts such as in-commuting and increased car usage. On this basis the plan should be considered unsound in that it is not positively prepared, justified, effective or consistent with national policy.

Policy DS5(S): This policy is then closely aligned with Policy DS2(S) in that it demonstrates where the new housing allocated by the plan is to be delivered, indicating the significant bulk is to be accommodated by new settlements which will only yield new homes deep into the plan period. It highlights the low level of development directed towards urban edge locations and simply illustrates our client’s concerns in respect of an entirely imbalanced development strategy. As an extension of Policy DS2(S) this policy should be considered unsound in that it is not positively prepared, justified, effective or consistent with national policy.